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THE THREE COMMANDMENTS OF AMENDING
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Victor Gold*
INTRODUCTION
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence (“the Rules”)
is considering an amendment to Rule 807, the residual exception to the rule
against hearsay. One aspect of the proposed amendment would permit
admission of hearsay not already covered by an exception in Rules 803 or
804 so long as the statement is “trustworthy” as established by
circumstances relating to the statement and corroborating evidence. This
would expand the scope of the residual exception in two ways. First, it
would eliminate language in the existing Rule that describes the degree of
trustworthiness required; the Rule currently requires that the proffered
hearsay have a level of trustworthiness “equivalent” to the exceptions in
Rules 803 and 804. Second, the proposed amendment would permit
trustworthiness to be established, at least in part, by corroborating evidence.
In contrast, the exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 make admissibility
dependent on only the circumstances surrounding the hearsay statement in
question.
The Rules have been amended many times in the forty years since they
were enacted. Unlike the original drafting process, which necessarily
involved consideration of the Rules as a whole, each round of amendments
was limited to a specific Rule or set of Rules.1 This particularized focus is
not myopic, but unavoidable; the Rules are numerous and complex, and the
time of the Advisory Committee and Congress is limited. But after more
than forty years, a broader perspective is possible. The purpose of this
Article is to provide a small bit of that perspective, which this Article
distills into three “commandments” for amending the Rules.2 After a brief
history of the residual exception and a description of the proposed

* William H. Hannon Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles.
1. The only semiexception to this occurred in 2011, when all the Rules were amended
for style. FED. R. EVID. 101 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment. The
amendments purported to make no substantive changes. Id.
2. Of course, when first enacted, there were Ten Commandments. Exodus 20:1–:17.
They were reduced in number as part of the general restyling of the Commandments to make
them more easily understood. The changes were intended to be stylistic only. See Matthew
5:17–:22.
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amendment, this Article considers the extent to which that proposal
complies with these commandments.
I. HISTORY OF THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION
Both Rules 803 and 804 contained versions of the residual exception
when the Rules were enacted in 1975.3 The redundancy and placement
were purposeful. Upon creating the residual exception, the Advisory
Committee made it clear that its intent was not the unfettered exercise of
judicial discretion. Instead, the purpose of this innovation was to leave
some room for admitting hearsay that was “within the spirit of the
specifically stated exceptions.”4 Thus, the residual exception was made a
part of both Rules 803 and 804 to show that the traditional exceptions and
the residual exception were complementary, not at odds.5 To reinforce this
connection to the traditional exceptions in Rules 803 and 804, the Advisory
Committee proposed a residual exception that made explicit reference to
those provisions and required “comparable circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.”6
This formulation was insufficient for the House Committee on the
Judiciary, which deleted the residual exception on the grounds that it
“inject[ed] too much uncertainty into the law of evidence and impair[ed] the
ability of practitioners to prepare for trial.”7 The Senate Judiciary
Committee agreed that an overly broad residual exception was dangerous8
but disagreed that deletion was appropriate.9 Instead, the Senate Committee
toughened the language of the exception to connect it even more closely to
the traditional exceptions in Rules 803 and 804, requiring that hearsay
admitted under the residual exception have “equivalent [not just
comparable] circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”10 The Senate
Committee intended that “the residual hearsay exceptions [would] be used

3. See FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note.
4. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 315
(1973).
5. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 20 (1974) (“It is intended that the residual hearsay
exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The committee
does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that
do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained in rules 803 and 804(b). The
residual exceptions are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule,
including its present exceptions.”). See generally People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12, 28 (Mich.
2003) (“Against the nearly four hundred-year-old historical development of our hearsay
rules, it is clear that the drafters of the rules did not intend a wholesale trampling of the
enumerated hearsay exceptions when the federal residual hearsay exceptions were
enacted.”).
6. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 18. The word “comparable” was used in the 1971 Revised
Draft of the Rules and the 1972 Supreme Court Draft. See Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. at 303, 322; Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 437, 439 (1971).
7. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 6 (1973).
8. See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 19.
9. Id. at 20.
10. Id. at 19.
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very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.”11 The Senate
Committee’s version was eventually enacted.
In 1997, by amendment, the residual exceptions in Rules 803 and 804
were deleted in favor of a single provision, Rule 807. The Advisory
Committee stated that the amendment’s purpose was simply to “facilitate
additions to Rules 803 and 804.”12 The requirement that hearsay admitted
under the residual exception have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness” was unchanged.13 Thus, while the residual exception was
no longer a part of Rules 803 and 804, the connection to those provisions,
as established by the text of Rule 807, remained in place.
In the more than forty years since the enactment of the Rules, courts have
been cautious when considering evidence under the residual exception. But
it is not accurate to say that the exception has been used “very rarely.”14
The Advisory Committee’s Reporter collected all reported cases in the past
ten years in which a court reviewed a claim that hearsay was admissible
under Rule 807.15 He informed the Advisory Committee that he found 114
cases in which the court seriously addressed a Rule 807 question and
excluded the evidence.16 He also found seventy-one cases in which the
hearsay was found admissible under Rule 807.17 While admitting that this
data provides an imprecise picture of how the residual exception has been
applied, the Reporter drew two conclusions: (1) the residual exception is
being invoked with surprising frequency and (2) courts are excluding the
proffered evidence more often than they are admitting it.18
II. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
The Advisory Committee has tentatively approved a working draft of an
amendment to Rule 807.19 The proposal would make several changes to the
provision, but this Article focuses on only one aspect of those changes. The
Rule currently reads, in part:

11. Id.
12. FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment.
13. As amended in 1997, Rule 807 reads, in pertinent part, “[A] hearsay statement is not
excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a
hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: [if] (1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 807. The Advisory Committee’s note to
the amendment stated, “The contents of Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) have been
combined and transferred to a new Rule 807. This was done to facilitate additions to Rules
803 and 804. No change in meaning is intended.” FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s
note to 1997 amendment.
14. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
15. See Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay
Rule from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Advisory
Comm. on Evidence Rules (Oct. 1, 2016), in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF EVIDENCE
OCTOBER 2016 AGENDA BOOK 109, 125 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
2016-10-evidence-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9GH-DHXD].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 109.
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(a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement
is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not
specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: (1) the
statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.20

The “working draft” of the proposed amendment would revise subsection
(a)(1) to read:
(a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement
is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not
specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: (1) the
court determines, after considering the pertinent circumstances and any
corroborating evidence, that the statement is trustworthy.21

The Reporter offered to the Advisory Committee the following rationale for
eliminating the reference to “equivalent” circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness:
The requirement that the court find trustworthiness “equivalent” to the
circumstantial guarantees in the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions should be
deleted. That standard is exceedingly difficult to apply, because there is
no unitary standard of trustworthiness in the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions.
It is common ground that statements falling within the Rule 804
exceptions are not as reliable as those admissible under Rule 803; and it is
also clear that the bases of reliability differ from exception to exception.
Moreover, one of the exceptions subject to “equivalence” review—Rule
804(b)(6) forfeiture—is not based on reliability at all. Given the difficulty
of the “equivalence” standard, a better approach is simply to require the
judge to find that the hearsay offered under Rule 807 is trustworthy.22

The Reporter also explained the reasons for amending Rule 807 to permit
corroborating evidence to help establish trustworthiness:
Trustworthiness can best be defined as a consideration of both
circumstantial guarantees and corroborating evidence. Most courts find
corroborating evidence to be relevant to the reliability enquiry, but some
do not. An amendment would be useful to provide uniformity in the
approach to evaluating trustworthiness under the residual exception—and
substantively, that amendment should specifically allow the court to
consider corroborating evidence, as corroboration is a typical source for
assuring that a statement is reliable.23

III. THE THREE COMMANDMENTS
The Advisory Committee’s proposed changes to Rule 807 are intended to
expand the application of the residual exception.24 Viewed from the
perspective of Congress’s original intent and the more than forty-year
history of amendment to the Rules, the proposal violates three
“commandments” that should guide the amendment process.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 2.
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A. Commandment I: If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It
The Rules should be amended only when there is a compelling case for
making the change. This is because there is almost always a cost to
amending established evidence rules. The case should be especially
compelling when the amendment contradicts the original congressional
intent.
There is not a compelling case for changing the “equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” language of Rule 807. The
Reporter notes that this language is illogical because there is significant
variation in the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness associated with
the traditional hearsay exceptions in Rules 803 and 804.25 This would be a
reason for amendment if the logical problem actually impacted how courts
apply the Rule, as would be the case if courts thought that the Rule required
that a given item of hearsay have guarantees of trustworthiness “equivalent”
to all of the traditional exceptions.26 Not surprisingly, the Reporter points
to no case that applies Rule 807 in this fashion.27 This logical problem is
avoided if “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” is
interpreted to mean that a court should compare the reliability of the
hearsay in question only to the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
demanded by the traditional exception or exceptions that deal with
analogous evidence or situations.28 This appears to be how courts actually
apply the residual exception.
Apart from the logic of the current Rule, the case for an amendment
might still be compelling if the extent of judicial discretion to admit
evidence under Rule 807 was unduly constrained by the requirement of
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” Of course,
reasonable minds can disagree over what is a proper level of discretion to
admit evidence under the residual exception. But it should be noted that
some thirty years after the Rule was enacted, the Ninth Circuit stated, “Our
research has disclosed only one instance where a circuit court reversed a

25. Id. at 5.
26. If there is a logical problem posed by the language in Rule 807 that refers to Rules
803 and 804, the solution might be to revise the language rather than simply delete the
reference. This appears to be what was behind the amendment to the residual exception in
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Uniform Rule 808 now reads, in part, “In exceptional
circumstances a statement not covered by Rules 803, 804, or 807 but possessing equivalent,
though not identical, circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the
hearsay rule.” UNIF. R. EVID. 808(a).
27. See Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule
from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15.
28. For example, documentary hearsay seems more trustworthy if the document was
created at a point in time near when the author of the document perceived the facts
described, as illustrated in Rules 803(5) and 803(6). See FED. R. EVID. 803(5)–(6). This is
especially important for written hearsay because there usually is a time gap between the
moment a person perceives certain facts and the time at which that person sets down those
facts in writing. If the gap is too long, the potential for memory to erode is significant. See,
e.g., Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights from Psychology and
Cognitive Neuroscience, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 182, 184 (1999) (discussing the “transience”
of memory and the process of gradual forgetting over time).
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district court to require admission of a statement under FRE 807.”29 Given
the proclivity of appellate courts to use the harmless error doctrine to avoid
reversing because of an error under evidence law, it is hard to believe that
trial courts feel unduly constrained by the current level of discretion to
admit evidence granted by the residual exception.
Amending Rule 807 also might be appropriate if problems in applying
the Rule are now apparent but were unanticipated when the Rule was
enacted. As noted above, in assessing ten years of cases applying the
residual exception, the Reporter found that the residual exception is invoked
with surprising frequency and that courts are excluding the proffered
evidence more often than admitting it.30 However, because the residual
exception is frequently invoked, this frequency can only increase if the
standard for admissibility is loosened.31 Additionally, if courts are
excluding evidence offered under the residual exception more often than
admitting it, then the residual exception is producing precisely the result
intended by Congress.32
The proposal to amend Rule 807 might be best explained as an effort to
address deeper problems presented by hearsay law that the Advisory
Committee is not yet prepared to address. The Advisory Committee has
been concerned with some established hearsay exceptions that are based on
questionable grounds and the exclusion of reliable hearsay because of an
unjustifiably negative view of a jury’s ability to weigh such evidence.33
But a broader review of the Rules regarding hearsay apparently has been
deferred by the Advisory Committee.34 If larger parts of hearsay law are
“broke” and need fixing, the Advisory Committee should undertake that
project. The assumption that a dose of judicial discretion is acceptable,
even as just an interim solution, disregards the potential costs of such an
approach, as described in the following section.
B. Commandment II: First, Do No Harm
When a patient has a problem, the first rule of the medical profession is
to proceed with caution. There are both practical and political reasons to
take a similarly conservative approach to amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
29. United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 2010).
30. See Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule
from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15, at 125.
31. This is the intended result of the proposal to amend Rule 807. See id. at 5 (quoting
the minutes of the spring 2016 meeting of the Advisory Committee). Similarly, the draft
Advisory Committee’s Note states that one of the goals of the proposal is “somewhat greater
use of the residual exception.” Id. at 9.
32. See supra notes 4–11.
33. See Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule
from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Advisory Comm. on
Evidence Rules 3 (Apr. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Reporter’s April Memorandum] (on file with
the Fordham Law Review).
34. Id. at 2 (describing the fall 2015 symposium on hearsay reform, and the related
meeting of the Advisory Committee, at which changes to various aspects of the rules
regarding hearsay, including Rule 807, were discussed).
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From a practical standpoint, amendments to the Rules create uncertainty.
Changes in law necessarily undermine the clarifying effect of precedent
based on the old standard. Of course, some Rule amendments make the
language of a Rule more precise and thereby enhance certainty, but
amendments making admissibility dependent on vague concepts like
“trustworthiness” are unlikely to have such an effect. While Rule 807
already employs this term, the proposed amendment would eliminate the
one aspect of the current Rule that provides some clarification as to its
meaning:
requiring a level of trustworthiness “equivalent” to the
exceptions in Rules 803 and 804.35 Absent any reference to the level of
required trustworthiness, the degree of uncertainty and the risk of
inconsistent application increases.
Certainty is a key value in the law of admissibility. As House and Senate
committees emphasized when considering the residual exception,36 the
ability to predict admissibility is essential to the trial lawyer. Predictability
influences how the lawyer will conduct discovery and prepare for trial,
assess an offer to settle or plea bargain, and decide what witnesses to call
and arguments to make. Certainty and predictability also are important for
the trial judge. The use of in limine rulings to streamline a trial is
constrained when standards are vague and require, as the proposed
amendment would, consideration of corroborating evidence heard during
trial.37 Precise admissibility rules can be applied quickly and do not disturb
the flow of a trial. However, when the Rules turn on broad concepts like
trustworthiness, the trial judge typically must interrupt the flow of the trial
to make a record of the reasons for her ruling or even hold a hearing on the
issue.38
The amendment to Rule 702 adopted in 2000 is illustrative of the effect
of vague admissibility standards on courts. That amendment was passed in
response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,39 which established that expert scientific evidence
must be both relevant and reliable. Mindful that such general standards
would be of little help to lower courts, the Supreme Court in Daubert went
on to identify a handful of specific factors that indicate the reliability of
35. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
36. See supra notes 7–11.
37. Cf. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984) (holding that the defendant did not
preserve for appeal the issue of admissibility of impeachment evidence where he sought an
in limine ruling and did not testify at trial). The Court stated:
A reviewing court is handicapped in any effort to rule on subtle evidentiary
questions outside a factual context. This is particularly true under Rule 609(a)(1),
which directs the court to weigh the probative value of a prior conviction against
the prejudicial effect to the defendant. To perform this balancing, the court must
know the precise nature of the defendant’s testimony, which is unknowable when,
as here, the defendant does not testify.
Id.
38. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 20 (1974) (“The special facts and circumstances which, in
the court’s judgment, indicate[] that the statement has a sufficiently high degree of
trustworthiness . . . should be stated on the record.”).
39. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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scientific evidence.40 The amendment to Rule 702 describes only the
general standard, requiring that expert testimony be based on “reliable
principles and methods . . . reliably applied . . . to the facts of the case.”41
More a general principle than a rule, “reliability” gives courts little
guidance. Accordingly, when lower courts are confronted with expert
testimony in disciplines outside of science, they follow Daubert but
struggle to identify concrete factors indicative of reliability in the specific
area of expertise at issue.42 An enormous number of reported cases have
undertaken this burden.43 While this factor analysis dominates the cases,
the broad language of the amended Rule is mentioned, if at all, only in
passing. Given the complexity of the issues that courts must resolve in
determining reliability, a “Daubert hearing,” at which all the pertinent
factors are weighed by the court on the record, is now a common
procedure.44 By removing the only aspect of the current Rule that attempts
to guide courts in determining the factors pertinent to trustworthiness, the
proposed amendment to Rule 807 points the law of hearsay down a similar
road.
A conservative approach to amending the Rules is rooted in more than
just practical concern for how amendments affect lawyers and judges. Such
an approach shows an understanding of the differences between initial
enactment and subsequent amendment. No work on an amendment can
ever match the attention given by the Advisory Committee, the Supreme
Court, and Congress when the Rules were initially proposed. A good
example is the controversy over the residual exception, which generated
conflicting House and Senate approaches and finally a compromise over
language.45 Moreover, only in the initial rulemaking process were the
Rules considered in their entirety. This made possible a balancing and
political compromise with a broad perspective. Subsequent amendments to
individual Rules are likely to be blind to the trade-offs that only are visible
through a holistic perspective.46 Subsequent amendments are also often
made without a full understanding of the impact those amendments will
have on other Rules.47 The Rules are a system, not a collection of unrelated
40. Id. at 593–94.
41. FED. R. EVID. 702(c)–(d). The Advisory Committee’s Note to the 2000 amendment
to Rule 702 observed, “No attempt has been made to ‘codify’ these specific factors.” FED. R.
EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
42. See 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§§ 6269.1–.10 (2d ed. 2016).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 6270.
45. See supra notes 7–11.
46. For a description of the extent to which Congress debated and revised the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence as a whole, see 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5006 (2d ed. 2005).
47. An ironic example is the addition in 1997 of Rule 804(b)(6), currently entitled
“Statement Offered Against a Party That Wrongfully Caused the Declarant’s
Unavailability.” The Reporter to the Advisory Committee cites this exception, which does
not depend on reliability as a basis for admitting hearsay, as an example of the lack of logic
behind Rule 807’s “equivalent” trustworthiness requirement. Memorandum Regarding
Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15,
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laws;48 changes in one Rule tend to produce unintended consequences in
others.
This is not to say that amendments lack legitimacy or are always a bad
idea. The world changes, we learn from experience, and the Rules should
adapt.
However, unless something significant changes, or unless
experience proves that the judgments of the original rulemakers were
wrong, the Advisory Committee should proceed with a healthy dose of
caution.
C. Commandment III: Be Careful What You Wish For
The proposal to expand the scope of the residual exception is likely to
produce a series of what may be unintended consequences. If the residual
exception in its current form is used with surprising frequency,49 we should
expect that loosening the standards of that exception will make its
invocation much more widespread.
Eliminating the “equivalent”
trustworthiness requirement implies that a lower level of trustworthiness is
sufficient for the residual exception.
Additionally, the proposed
amendment would make it easier to establish trustworthiness, permitting the
court to consider both the circumstances surrounding the hearsay statement
and corroborating evidence. The exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 permit
consideration of only the former.50
For the same reasons, the proposed amendment should trigger a
significant expansion in the use of the “near miss doctrine,”51 under which
at 114. There is no indication that when Rule 804 was amended to add the forfeiture by
wrongdoing to this exception, the drafters had any inkling that this would have implications
for Rule 807.
48. For example, consider the manner in which Rule 602 (the personal knowledge
requirement) and Rule 802 (the hearsay rule) work together. 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6023 (2007).
49. Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule
from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15, at 125.
50. The proposed amendment to Rule 807 raises a number of difficult issues by
suggesting that the trustworthiness and admissibility of a given item of hearsay can be
established, at least in part, by corroborating evidence. These issues include the following:
Does the corroborating evidence itself have to be admissible? Can two items of otherwise
inadmissible hearsay corroborate each other and, thus, bootstrap each into admissibility?
The proposed amendment to Rule 807 would retain the aspect of the current version of Rule
807 that requires hearsay be more probative on the point for which it is offered than other
evidence. See Memorandum Regarding Expanding the Residual Exception to the Hearsay
Rule from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15, at 113. But if corroborating evidence can
establish admissibility of the hearsay, does that not mean that the probative value of the
hearsay is diminished? See JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 672–73 (5th ed.
1999) (noting that a need for evidence is a factor in assessing probative value under Rule
403). In that case, corroborating evidence is a mitigating factor in favor of admissibility
under one part of the proposed Rule 807, while mitigating against admissibility under
another part of that provision. How should a court resolve this conflict in exercising its
discretion?
51. Under the “near miss” doctrine, Rule 807 can be used to admit hearsay that is
covered by the exceptions in Rules 803 or 804 but fails to meet all the requirements of that
exception. For example, a business record that meets most but not all of the requirements of
Rule 803(6) might be admitted under Rule 807 on the theory that, so long as the
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the residual exception can be employed to make admissible an item of
hearsay that satisfies some but not all of the requirements of an exception in
Rules 803 or 804.52 In fact, the Reporter suggests this is an intended
consequence of the proposed amendment to Rule 807.53 While one can
argue about the merits of the near miss doctrine, an amendment to Rule 807
should not pursue such an objective without acknowledging that it
undermines congressional intent: Congress said that it connected the
residual exception to the trustworthiness standards of Rules 803 and 804 for
the purpose of preventing the emasculation of the traditional exceptions
codified in those provisions.54
Moreover, we should not imagine that this expansion of the residual
exception would be outcome neutral. If hearsay were a retail product,
government and businesses would be Walmart, every day generating
unfathomable numbers of documents concerning every aspect of their
affairs. The government and businesses can be expected to take full
advantage of the opportunity to use an expanded residual exception as a
way to avoid the more limiting constraints of the business and public
records exceptions to the hearsay rule. Individual litigants are less likely to
plan for and enjoy the benefit of an expansive residual exception.
While expanded use of the proposed amendment to the residual exception
may often make the exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 superfluous, the
greatest impact would be on the rule against hearsay itself, Rule 802. The
requirements of the latter seem to have been met, the fact that the evidence fails to satisfy the
specific exception for business records does not mean the evidence should be excluded. See,
e.g., United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 778 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that where hearsay
failed to satisfy the business records exception in Rule 803(6) because the party offering
hearsay failed to call a foundation witness to qualify the records, Rule 807 could be used to
admit the evidence on the ground that it was otherwise reliable). While a number of courts
have adopted this approach, other courts have held that a near miss is simply a miss, and thus
evidence that is of a type addressed by a specific hearsay exception like Rule 803(6), but
which fails to satisfy all the requirements of that exception, cannot be admitted under Rule
807. See, e.g., Bryndle v. Boulevard Towers, II, LLC, 132 F. Supp. 3d 486, 497 (W.D.N.Y.
2015) (holding that where hearsay failed to satisfy the business records exception in Rule
803(6) because the party offering hearsay failed to call a foundation witness to qualify the
records, Rule 807 could not be used to admit the evidence on the ground that it was
otherwise reliable). For a discussion of the near miss debate, see Elizabeth DeCoux, Textual
Limits on the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule: The “Near Miss” Debate and
Beyond, 35 S.U. L. REV. 99 (2007).
52. The Reporter notes that a majority of courts permit the residual exception to admit
hearsay that falls under a category covered by a specific exception in Rules 803 or 804 but
fails to meet all the requirements of that exception. Reporter’s April Memorandum, supra
note 33, at 8.
53. Id. at 3.
54. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 18–19 (1974). The Reporter suggests that the proposed
amendment would not permit Rule 807 to “swallow the categorical exceptions,” because the
amendment would retain the requirement that the hearsay in question be more probative on
the point for which it is offered than other evidence. Memorandum Regarding Expanding the
Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 15, at 111–12.
The logic behind this assertion is unclear. Retention of the “more probative” requirement
has to do with whether there is other evidence on point, not whether the hearsay in question
is admitted under Rule 807 even though it is not made admissible by the categorical
exceptions of Rules 803 and 804.

2017] THREE COMMANDMENTS OF AMENDING THE RULES

1625

proposed expansion of the residual exception would make Rule 802 the
only general rule of exclusion subject to a broad judicial power to admit
evidence on the ground that the reason for applying the exclusion seems
weak.55 There is no general exception to privileges where the court thinks
that, under the circumstances, the policies underlying the privileges are
weak. The limits on character evidence are not subject to a general
exception creating discretion to admit evidence if the judge thinks the jury
is unlikely to be improperly prejudiced. Similarly, the “best evidence
rule”56 does not contain a general exception allowing all secondary
evidence to be admitted so long as the judge thinks that evidence is a
“trustworthy” rendition of the contents of the original writing. Of course,
Rule 403 gives courts discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence
in an appropriate case. However, no Rule establishes discretion to admit
evidence that is otherwise inadmissible. This is because such a Rule runs
counter to the very notion of codifying rules of admissibility. The Senate
Judiciary Committee made this very point when considering the residual
exception: “an overly broad residual hearsay exception could . . . vitiate the
rationale behind codification of the rules.”57
CONCLUSION
Evidence law attempts to balance the benefits of specific admissibility
standards against the need for discretion. These are complementary values,
as when there are no standards the law is arbitrary, but without discretion
the law is mindless. The trick is to avoid striking the balance too far in one
direction or the other. One way to tell whether the balance is proper is to
ask whether there are factors to guide discretion. Since Rule 807’s
inception, discretion to decide trustworthiness under the Rule has been
anchored to the exceptions in Rules 803 and 804. Sever that anchor, and
the residual exception is adrift.

55. The principal reason for excluding hearsay is, when a statement is given out of court,
reliability cannot be tested through cross-examination before the trier of fact. See 30
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 6325 (1997).
56. See FED. R. EVID. 1002.
57. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 19.

